The purpose of the present paper is threefold. First, my ambition is to improve the analytical framework that is used to assess the legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights.
I. Introduction
'If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change'. The bon mot from Giuseppe di Lampedusa's roman, The Leopard, is often quoted today in relation to Europe's current challenges. After the Brexit referendum, it is now a widely shared opinion that the European Union needs a new vision. This new vision requires the reopening of the debate about the proper relationship between nation states and international organisations. The question is whether there is an appetite for a similar debate about the European human rights regime. Even if many decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the ECtHR, the Strasbourg court, or the Court) are fiercely criticised, the dominant position seems to be that the European human rights regime functions reasonably well. The Court is often called the 'conscience of Europe' and is held in high esteem by commentators. As one of those commentators puts it, the ECtHR is 'the crown jewel of the world's most advanced
II. Preliminary points
The question I will address in this paper is as follows: what kind of justificatory reasons do states have to construct (or remain members of) international human rights regimes that adjudicate and enforce human rights? My aim here is not to offer a causal explanation of why the authority of an international court is perceived to be justified, but to engage with the reasons that are or can be offered as justification. 11 Although the question of whether a state had good reasons (or would have good reasons today) to join an international human rights system is analytically different from the one of whether it has good reasons to leave the same human rights system, I contend that there is a significant overlap between the arguments that are relevant in the two contexts. In the course of my inquiry, I will set aside three argumentative strategies that are, in my view, inadequate in answering the above question.
First, every sophisticated theory of human rights adjudication must distinguish between political principles and political institutions. My contention is that all attempts that focus only on the general importance of or general commitment to human rights are doomed to fail since the question at hand is primarily an institutional one. A general commitment to human rights is unable to settle the institutional question of how human rights should be adjudicated and enforced. The flip side of this point is that challenging the European human rights regime cannot be conflated with the criticism of human rights as such. The proponents of the institutional status quo cannot vindicate the moral high ground for themselves and cannot claim that they are the only ones who take human rights seriously. Third, my argument is based on the assumption that human rights have very often more than one reasonable interpretation. Even if each right has an uncontroversial core meaning, my contention is that the cases that the ECtHR finds admissible and originate from stable democracies typically do not belong to this category. The existence of reasonable rights disagreements implies that an adequate justificatory theory cannot rely on the outcome of particular decisions as the criterion of institutional legitimacy. It is a non-starter to argue that the ECtHR got it right in case x and that it made a decision that is superior to the one that was delivered by a domestic court. Although outcome-related considerations should play an important role in the justificatory discourse, these considerations must be relatively general and focus on the epistemological and motivational features of institutions rather than the outcome of particular decisions. This restriction on the eligible justificatory arguments has far-reaching methodological implications -a few of them are worth emphasising here.
The debate about the legitimacy of the European human rights regime is dominated by human rights lawyers (including the judges of the Court) whose primary expertise is on doctrinal issues and whose research focuses on the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court.
However, if an adequate justificatory theory must centre around general institutional considerations rather than around the evaluation of particular decisions, then this expertise on doctrinal issues can play only a limited role in the justificatory debate. Assessing the epistemological performance of an institution and the motivations of its members is not a matter of doctrinal expertise.
My argument also aims to demonstrate that many of the relevant justificatory considerations are empirical in nature. Whether a state has good reasons to confer authority on an international human rights court depends both on the robustness of its own political institutions and the extent to which it can influence other states. the jurisprudence of the international court in question.
As is well-known, in the first years of its existence, the ECtHR did not seem to develop into a high-profile institution, and the expectation was that its operation would not really affect mature democracies. 17 To put it in the terminology of the present article, the sovereignty costs of the regime were perceived to be marginal. This was probably a decisive consideration for many countries, including the United Kingdom, that allowed them to accept the jurisdiction of the court and the right of individual petition. 18 Human rights do not provide us with algorithms that mechanically decode the meaning of legal provisions; in order to apply these provisions to particular situations, we have to inject meaning into these abstract provisions. Choosing one particular conception of an abstract concept instead of another will inevitably reflect the moral outlook of the interpreter.
32
Defining the more precise meaning of human dignity, equality, privacy or freedom is not a Although this question is most often raised in the context of the EU, and the EU and the ECHR are legally distinct entities, a country's general stand on a European demos also shapes its attitude toward the ECHR. One factor that explains why the UK is more critical of the European human rights regime than other countries is that the idea of an overarching
European demos has always been glaringly unattractive in the UK. Even before the Brexit referendum, David Cameron, then the Prime Minister of the UK, negotiated a deal with the EU that exempted the UK from the principle of an 'ever closer union'.
IV. Epistemic considerations
Although transferring a part of a state's authority to an international human rights court has considerable costs in terms of sovereignty, the benefits of such a transfer might compensate for that loss. An international court might be better suited or better motivated to protect human rights than national courts. I will turn first to the question of whether international courts have an epistemic edge over their national counterparts. I will argue that the exact opposite is true and a combination of epistemic considerations and legitimacy-related recasting it in a different conceptual framework.
First of all, I submit that the term 'application' is too vague for our present purposes.
When applying abstract human rights provisions to particular cases, there are usually many premises in the argument that mediate between the abstract human rights provision and the facts of the case. To put it differently, judges are required to choose one of the rival interpretations or conceptions of abstract human rights provisions, that is to say, they are required to specify or articulate the meaning of the said rights before they can apply them to the facts of the case. 34 For instance, when the Court asserts that the decision about our own death is within the scope of the right to private life, this premise mediates between the abstract right and the facts of the case, but this specification itself does not require the intimate knowledge of the latter. The idea of Reasonable Pluralism does not challenge the possibility of objectively true moral propositions; it puts forward a claim not about their truth but about their justifiability. 37 Its central tenet is that even if there are moral propositions that can be justified to each person, on most complex moral issues people will reasonably hold different views.
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A will be justified in holding p while B will be justified in holding non-p. If that is the case, both p and non-p are inconclusively justified.
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As there seems to be a tension between the idea of Reasonable Pluralism and the universality of human rights, it is important to clarify their relationship here. When people claim that human rights are universal, they often endorse two distinct theses about human rights.
(1) When someone claims that A has a human right to x, she makes a claim about the scope and the preconditions of the said right. Every human being, so the argument runs, has the right to x by virtue of being human, regardless of their membership in any political community or their personal qualities and circumstances. This is a substantive moral claim about the scope of human rights and not an epistemological one. The substantive claim may or may not be supported by universally justified reasons. In addition, many advocates of human rights also endorse the epistemic claim that (2) human rights are universally justified and that no reasonable person can reject such claims.
The idea of Reasonable Pluralism is an epistemic position and as such is agnostic on (but is compatible with) the thesis of universal scope. It is also compatible with the idea that some human rights claims are universally justifiable. However, the proponents of this position hold that the specification of human rights is very often subject to reasonable disagreement and we cannot expect even in the long run that such disagreements will disappear. To use computer parlance, reasonable disagreement is not a bug, but a feature of the human condition.
Since the text of human rights documents do not impose sufficiently strong limits on the discretion of judges and they themselves often revolve around complex moral issues, the interpretation of human rights (both determining the scope of those rights and balancing them 37 The distinction between the I will argue that there are at least two important reasons against this practice. First, even if a moral principle cannot be universally justified, it might be justified to each member of a bounded political community. I will call the principles that satisfy this criterion publicly justified principles. I will also assume that within that bounded political community, a publicly justified interpretation of a human right is preferable to one that is justified only to one segment of the community. But even if none of the interpretations of an abstract right can actually be publicly justified, the court must at least be able to track publicly justified principles. 43 The judges of domestic courts are in a better position to assess what is justified within the belief systems of their fellow citizens. It would be absurd to claim, for instance, that a Russian judge would be particularly well-suited to assess which principles are justified in the belief systems of British citizens and vice versa.
Second, even if a human right does not have a publicly justified interpretation within a political community, it is important that a wide range of the reasonable interpretations that are prevalent in that community be fairly represented in the decision-making process. An international court cannot plausibly claim that it reflects the reasonable views that are prevalent in the said community. Although it might be the case that domestic courts also track 41 Helfer and Slaughter (n 4) 368. For a similar position, see Benvenisti (n 37) 843. At this point, it could be objected that (1) giving pre-eminence to domestic courts in the specification of human rights is likely to make their jurisprudence parochial and (2) it also shields domestic practices from international criticism. As to the first objection, there is a huge difference between making uniformity a regulative ideal and broadening the pool of arguments by disseminating information and sharing good practices on human rights issues.
Broadening the pool of relevant arguments requires neither the uniform specification of human rights nor an international court with the final authority to determine the meaning of such rights. with manifestly unreasonable interpretations of human rights. My contention here is that this institutional dilemma does not have a universal solution. We can err in both directions and the optimal choice between the two alternatives will depend primarily on the shape of the political system.
Others might object that although they find my argument compelling, all that is said here is already accounted for by the doctrines of the margin of appreciation and subsidiarity. 46 As many commentators have observed, in recent years, the Court has followed an increasingly deferential approach that often focuses on the procedural aspect of national decision-making instead of the substantive correctness of the decision. 47 In the recent Copenhagen Declaration, the Committee of Ministers has put even greater emphasis on the freedom of domestic courts in the balancing process. 48 Robert Spano goes so far as claiming that the 'age of subsidiarity' has arrived. 49 I find this objection unconvincing for two reasons. 
V. Reasonable disagreement and weak judicial review
The idea of Reasonable Pluralism, combined with some plausible assumptions about political legitimacy, provides us with a general argument for the pre-eminence of domestic courts in the specification of human rights. However, this general argument is further accentuated in jurisdictions in which the institutional design of constitutional review itself reflects that human rights may have more than one reasonable interpretation.
As is well known to comparative constitutional lawyers, the Commonwealth model of judicial review has established a mechanism of human rights protection in which the legislature can disregard or override a court's determination of what a human right requires. 
VI. The argument from political malfunctions
The strongest argument for domestic constitutional review is not that courts have an epistemic advantage over legislative bodies to make good decisions, but rather that the members of the two institutions are differently motivated and the courts' insulation from the political process is a major advantage when it comes to the specification of human rights. By contrast, Russia, one of the two authoritarian states, generated alone 293 judgments that found at least one violation.
There is a clear correlation between the robustness of the political system and the gravity of human rights violations. In full democracies, the number of judgments that found at least one violation is 0.16 for one million inhabitants. The respective number is 0.95 in flawed democracies, 1.59 in hybrid regimes and 2.06 in authoritarian regimes. The robustness of political institutions is also the most reliable indicator of whether a state will comply with the unfavourable decisions of the Court. 66 If the rationale for an international human rights court is the correction of political malfunctions, different member states simply have very different needs.
Some commentators have noticed that the critique of the ECtHR has created an odd alliance between the United Kingdom and Russia. 67 When someone raises the possibility that the United Kingdom could withdraw from the ECHR, commentators routinely point out that
with that move, the UK would align itself with Belarus and would become a pariah state.
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Although at first sight, these parallels seem indeed odd and striking, the argument from political malfunctions is able to provide a plausible explanation for them.
Andrew Moravcsik has argued in an excellent paper that the differences between consolidated democracies, new democracies, and authoritarian regimes can account for how different countries acted during the negotiating history of the ECHR. 69 I suggest here that the explanatory power of his theory is not limited to the negotiating period of the ECHR but also applies, to some extent, to contemporary attitudes towards the ECtHR.
A.) Authoritative governments do not care much about human rights, they do not want any restrictions on their power and, therefore, have a strong motivation to ignore the decisions of human rights courts or minimise their impact. Since it is unlikely that they will lose their power, they do not have incentives to create insurance mechanisms for the period when they are in opposition.
B.) Consolidated democracies might be as critical of strong human rights courts as authoritarian regimes. 71 However, my contention is that unlike authoritarian regimes, they have not only an understandable motive but also a valid justificatory reason to be less enthusiastic about such courts. Since they have robust political institutions and a strong tradition of judicial independence, they have much less reason to believe that their domestic courts will cease to function properly and will become unable to protect human rights on their own. Although we cannot eliminate this possibility altogether, we should not assess this argument in isolation, but as part of the justificatory equation. It is not unjustified to believe that having an insurance mechanism in the form of an international court for the unlikely event that the domestic judiciary becomes dysfunctional, does not compensate for the certain and immediate costs of the transfer of authority in procedural and epistemic terms.
The logic of the above argument applies to all stable democracies and is not limited to the United Kingdom. However, just as the epistemic argument against international human rights adjudication, the argument from political malfunctions also gets a special twist in light of the UK's constitutional traditions. The idea of 'locking in' or putting some policy decisions beyond the reach of ordinary majorities fits well with the constitutional traditions of most European countries. All other European states have entrenched constitutions -that is, in these states, amending the constitution requires a more burdensome process than ordinary legislation. In addition, no fewer than 14 European constitutions have so-called 'eternity clauses' that make certain provisions or principles of their respective constitutions unamendable. By contrast, the very idea of entrenchment is at odds with the traditional understanding of parliamentary supremacy, the most fundamental principle of the British constitution.
C.) Finally, new democracies that are committed to the idea of human rights have more reasons to believe that they need an external institution as an insurance in case there was a backlash in the process of democratisation. The politicians of the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, for instance, had good reasons to seek such an insurance policy after the collapse of the socialist regime. Since they had no experience with the peaceful change of government, by putting some issues beyond the domestic political process, they could ensure that at least some decisions could not be changed even if they lost their power. 
VII. The argument from reputation
The question of how reputational concerns motivate states is discussed extensively in the theory of international law and international relations. 73 Although most of these studies focus on how a country's reputational interests influence its compliance with international law, many of the insights of this literature are relevant beyond the question of compliance.
Reputational interests can both explain and justify why a state ratifies an international treaty in the first place. From this more general perspective, compliance with international commitments is only one factor in the overall reputation of a country.
Each country wants to be respected by others and secure a certain status or standing within the international community. Or to be more precise, each country wants to portray a certain image about itself and wants to be not simply respected but respected as a polity of a certain kind. This image is constituted partly by values the country identifies with. Other polities that share the same values serve as a reference group for the country in question.
However, it is important to note that the image the country wants to portray does not necessarily coincide with the one that makes a country appealing to the international community.
For many countries, the liberal conception of human rights is an integral part of the image they want to portray. They want to be recognised as a polity that respects those rights.
A good track record of human rights protection is not only a source of self-esteem but also earns them the recognition of other states.
The reputation of a country is made up of different factors, some of which have nothing to do with formal institutions. But perhaps it is not a coincidence that the countries with the strongest overall reputation are exactly the ones that are the most democratic. In the previous section, I have already alluded to the Economist Intelligence Unit that publishes every year its report on the democratic performance of states. 74 The Reputation Institute is an organisation that monitors the 55 biggest economies and ranks the 'brand value' of those countries. Unsurprisingly, the top ten lists of the two rankings are almost identical. 75 My contention is that the argument concerning a state's reputation sheds further light on why different countries have different attitudes towards the European human rights regime.
A.) New democracies that aspire to be seen as countries that respect human rights consider consolidated democracies as a reference group. Since they aspire to become stable democracies, they feel cognitive and social pressure to respect human rights. The cognitive pressure comes from the fact that they want to minimise the dissonance between their actions and the image they want to portray. 76 But they also want to avoid criticism, naming and shaming, and want to get positive feedback and public approval from the members of their reference group. The mechanism when someone conforms to the expectations and behaviour of others without fully internalising the values that create those expectations is called acculturation. 77 Acculturation is different from persuasion, as it implies only conformity to, but not necessarily belief in, the importance of those values. But acculturation is also different from tactical concession as it derives not from utilitarian calculation but from the identification with a certain reference group. 78 Acculturation is probably one of the most important mechanisms that are responsible for isomorphism. 79 In the present context, isomorphism means that countries with very different traditions and demands create increasingly similar legal and political institutions.
Isomorphism is a well-documented phenomenon in constitutional design and in the protection of human rights. 80 The ECtHR has an important role in that process, as the Court is both a beneficiary and an agent of acculturation (although the doctrine of the margin of appreciation mitigates the homogenising effect of the Court's jurisprudence.) Today, subjecting national legal systems to the authority of the ECtHR is seen as the norm in Europe. The normal way of doing things creates expectations, and deviation from the normal course of action attracts criticism and is detrimental to the reputation of the deviant state (for example, see the reference above to Belarus as a pariah state). There is empirical evidence that new democracies sent judges to the ECtHR who were, on average, more activist than the ones sent by consolidated democracies, to prove that they were good students. 83 In addition, judges from former socialist countries were harsher on other socialist countries than they were on countries without socialist heritage. 84 The credible commitment to the protection of human rights certainly improved the reputation of these countries. For the same reason, their reputation would be seriously damaged if they left the ECHR. But the Court has also contributed to how the citizens of these countries judged the reputation of their respective countries. The judgements of the Court have served as a shared point of reference by which the participants of the domestic political discourse assessed and criticised the actions of others and justified their own actions.
B.) There are some member states, such as Russia, Turkey, and Hungary that have become vocal critics of the Strasbourg court. Of course, these countries also want to be respected but want to be respected on their own terms, and not as liberal democracies. It is telling, for example, that of all the countries that are monitored by the Reputation Institute, the biggest gap between the external reputation of the country and its self-image reputation 81 However, it has to be mentioned that material inducement was also an important motivating factor for many countries since ratifying the ECHR was a precondition of EU membership. Available at: <kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-sspeech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp>. 87 Available at: <miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-beszede-a-hatarvadaszok-eskutetelen-2> . 88 Responding to the critiques of the recent attack on the judiciary, Poland's Justice Minister, Zbigniew Ziobro's reply is replete with references to respect ("We expect and demand respect", for example). 'EU-Poland row gets personal as war of words heats up' Euronews, 27 July 2017. Available at: <euronews.com/2017/07/27/eupoland-row-gets-personal-as-war-of-words-heats-up> 89 As of writing this article, Hungarian streets are full of posters declaring that "Hungary is a proud and strong In these countries, the Court's jurisprudence has never served or no longer serves as a shared point of reference in domestic political discourse. Although civil society organisations and opposition parties might refer to the decisions of the Court, these critiques do not appeal to the whole political community, as most supporters of the government do not consider these decisions as legitimate standards by which the government should be judged.
C.) Finally, the respect for human rights plays a central role in the self-image of consolidated democracies and this is one of the reasons that these countries have a strong reputation. However, their reputation as human rights compliant countries builds primarily on their own track record and does not rely so much on the stamp of approval from an international court. I am not saying that withdrawing from the ECHR would not negatively affect the reputation of these states. It certainly would. Regardless of the actual standard of human rights protection, the perception would be that they do not take human rights seriously enough. Perhaps even more importantly, mature democracies could also be criticised for sending the wrong message to those states that would indeed profit from the supervision of the Strasbourg court. My point is that their reputation would suffer much less than that of new democracies since they could more credibly claim that their system of human rights protection is robust enough even without the support of the Strasbourg court. States with authoritarian tendencies might pay lip service to human rights and comply with the individual decisions of the ECtHR; however, they will try to minimise the effects of such decisions and limit the authority of the Court to what is called in the literature 'narrow authority'. 104 Although providing remedies to individual victims of human rights violations is important in its own right, the ECtHR is simply not in the position to give effective remedy to 839 million people without the contribution of the member states. 105 Therefore, the success of the European human rights regime depends on whether the behaviour of non-cooperating states can be changed.
The precondition of acculturation is that countries without long democratic tradition consider liberal democracies as a reference group and identify with core liberal values.
However, some countries, such as Russia, Turkey and Hungary, aspire to provide an illiberal alternative to constitutional democracies rather than to become one of them. Without the resources and willingness to coerce the states that do not comply with human rights standards and without the preconditions of successful socialisation, neither the argument from collective responsibility nor the argument from collective security is convincing. If my analysis is correct, today the argument from collective security offers very little to consolidated democracies: it is debatable whether the human rights violations of other European countries impose serious externalities on them, and even if that is the case, they have little chance to socialise non-compliant states.
IX. Conclusion
I have argued in the present paper that each country has both valid procedural and epistemic 102 Goodman and Jinks (n 12) 629. 103 reasons to give pre-eminence to their domestic courts in the specification of human rights.
Although these reasons must be balanced against other arguments (the argument form political malfuncions, the argument from reputation, the argument from collective responsibility and security, for example), the strength of the latter arguments is contingent on the robustness of democratic institutions. I am not claiming here that these considerations can never tip the balance of arguments in favour of a strong transnational human rights regime for some countries. However, I submit that the balance of arguments is very different in the case of stable democracies with a strong tradition of judicial independence and a reasonably good track record of human rights protection, such as the United Kingdom. I believe that they have good reasons to remain part of the European human rights regime only if the ECtHR applies a consistently deferential approach with regard to them and does not replace the reasonable human rights interpretations of the domestic courts of those democracies with its own reasonable views. Even though the ECtHR currently gives more leeway to national courts than before, the Court's activity still goes well beyond policing the limits of reasonable interpretations of human rights.
Although these considerations are not unique to the United Kingdom, there are some further reasons that explain or justify (or both) why the UK is especially critical of the Strasbourg court. Starting with the most obvious point, the idea of an overarching European demos as the location of final political authority has always been glaringly unattractive in the UK. That is one factor that explains why the UK is more critical of the Court than many other stable democracies. Second, the idea of putting certain policy decisions beyond the ordinary political process (a method often used to address political malfunctions) is also foreign to the British constitutional tradition that is built on the idea of parliamentary supremacy. Finally, the supervision of the Strasbourg court fits uneasily with a domestic system of human rights protection that gives the final say on what human rights require to the legislature, and is, arguably, predicated on the idea that legislators and courts are epistemic equals when it comes to the specification of human rights.
